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Abstract 
 
Constant returns to scale (CRS) is one of the corner-
stones of the competitive general equilibrium para-
digm of neoclassical economics. This note argues that 
the equilibrium solutions of this paradigm are not 
compatible with CRS. CRS implies that all producers 
(whatever their scale of production) can produce 
goods at the same unit costs: and this makes self-
production a feasible alternative to market produc-
tion. In the event, an infinite number of equilibria be-
come possible with a mix of markets and self-
production. If labor is the only factor of production, 
self-production becomes the only option: and the 
market economy ceases to exist.  
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All too often the core competitive paradigm of neoclassical economics has been 
criticized for its many unrealistic assumptions. Many of its critics have also de-
veloped new approaches to the study of economics based on more realistic as-
sumptions: among these one may mention the old and new institutional eco-
nomics, behavioral economics, the economics of limited information, evolu-
tionary economics, and the applications of game theory to the study of strategic 
behavior. Regardless of these critiques - and the presence of alternative ap-
proaches to the study of the economy - the neoclassical paradigm could not be 
dislodged from its position of eminence in economics. Kenneth Arrow (1994: 
451) thinks that this is because “competitive general equilibrium theory is still 
the only coherent account of the entire economy.” Others are of the opinion 
that the success of neoclassical economics is assured by the kind of economic 
system it supports: the capitalism of unfettered markets.1 
Can the competitive paradigm be shown to be flawed on grounds of inter-
nal consistency: not because of its unrealistic assumptions? It is unarguably 
the case that neoclassical economics would be hamstrung without the assump-
tion of constant returns to scale in production. Allyn Young (1928) and later 
Nicholas Kaldor (1967 and 1972)  have shown that equilibrium economics 
becomes irrelevant in the presence of increasing returns to scale. But neoclas-
sical economics is in trouble even with the assumption of constant returns to 
scale: only, this is a problem that has gone unnoticed. At least since Leon 
Walras, economists have constructed mathematical models to establish the 
conditions under which a market economy - with fixed resources, tastes and 
                                                             
1  Joseph Stiglitz (2001) agrees: in his Nobel Price lecture, he says, “One might 
ask, how can we explain the persistence of the paradigm for so long? Partly, it 
must be because, in spite of its deficiencies, it did provide insights into many 
economic phenomena. .. But one cannot ignore the possibility that the surviv-
al of the [neoclassical] paradigm was partly because the belief in that paradigm, 
and the policy prescriptions, has served certain interests." In a similar vein, 
James Tobin (1985: 30-31) writes, “In positive as well as normative theory, ne-
oclassical economics was in a much better position than classical economics to 
respond to the Marxist challenge.” 
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technology - will attain an equilibrium that also fulfils the conditions for the 
efficient allocation of resources. Constant returns to scale - or the more gen-
eral assumption of non-increasing returns to scale - is the cornerstone of all 
these models. Given this assumption’s centrality, it is surprising that no one 
has asked if the general equilibrium economy is logically compatible with this 
assumption. Our concern here is not with the existence - or uniqueness and 
stability - of solutions to the system of equations that define the neoclassical 
economy. Instead, we ask a simpler and more basic question. Can a neoclassi-
cal economy exist in the presence of constant returns to scale? 
A short note might suffice to answer this question, but lest it become too 
short we will start with the mercantilists and Adam Smith. This digression will 
provide some historical perspective on how constant returns to scale became 
one of the cornerstones of neoclassical theory. A little history cannot hurt 
even in a discipline that does not take too kindly to history. 
 
1. Classical Economics 
 
A central purpose of Adam Smith in writing the Wealth of Nations was to dis-
credit the dirigiste policies of the mercantilist and make the case for laissez 
faire. It is therefore ironic that he should open his treatise on political econ-
omy  with a central insight from mercantilist writings regarding the power of 
increasing returns to scale in manufacturing.2 
                                                             
2  Salim Rashid has examined some of the precedents of the advantages of the 
division of labor in the writings of British mercantilists. Salim Rashid, The 
myth of Adam Smith (Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 
1998): 16-19. On the medieval antecedents of this idea in the Islamic world, 
see Guang-Zhen Sun, “The economics of division of labor from Xenophon to 
Hayek (1945): A review of selected literature,” in: Readings in the economics of 
the division of labor: The classical tradition (Hackensack, NJ : World Scientific, 
2005): 5-9. Interestingly, the great Muslim philosopher, theologian and sufi, 
Ahmad Al-Ghazzali (1058-1111), even illustrates this principle with the exam-
ple of pin-making. 
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“The greatest improvement,” writes Adam Smith, “in the productive pow-
ers of labor, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity, and judgment with 
which it is anywhere directed, or applied, seem to have been the effects of the 
division of labor.” Division of labor contributes to labor productivity in three 
ways: it augments worker skills, saves time lost in moving from one task to 
another, and facilitates the increasing use of machines. The use of machinery 
is perhaps the most important of these three sources of gains in productivity 
that flow from division of labor: it “enable[s] one man to do the work of 
many.” In pin manufacturing, Adam Smith tells us, the average output of 
each man - working as part of a team of ten workers - is 4,800 pins per day; 
working independently “they certainly could not each of them have made 
twenty [pins], perhaps not one pin in a day.”3 The returns to scale in pin-
making then are quite extraordinary: division of labor increased the output of 
each worker by a multiple of 240. Moreover, these gains were attained with-
out the use of any external sources of energy. 
Adam Smith makes it clear that the magnitude of productivity gains from 
division of labor in pin making is not an outlier. “In every other art and man-
ufacture,” he writes, “the effects of the division of labor are similar to what 
they are in this trifling one; though, in many of them, the labor can neither be 
so much subdivided, nor reduced to so great a simplicity of operation. The 
division of labor, however, so far as it can be introduced, occasions, in every art, 
a proportionate increase in the productive powers of labor (emphasis added).” 
Agriculture is the exception to these extraordinary productivity gains: the se-
quential nature of many of its operations limit the scope of division of labor 
in this sector.4   
Although he does not elaborate upon it, the dynamic implications of the 
division of labor are clear to Adam Smith. “As it is the power of exchanging,” 
he writes in chapter three of his treatise, “that gives occasion to the division of 
labor, so the extent of this division must always be limited by the extent of 
                                                             
3  Adam Smith (1776/1975): 3,7.  
4  Smith ( 1776/1975): 5-6. 
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that power, or, in other words, by the extent of the market.”5 Clearly, this 
establishes a two-way feedback between the division of labor and the size of 
markets: of necessity, this connection must create a virtuous circle of growth. 
The mercantilists understood this dynamic, at the center of whose thinking 
stood ‘art and manufacture,’ and hence they were willing to move heaven and 
earth to advance manufactures and externally directed commerce.6  This was 
the chief engine of growth. 
But this is not where Adam Smith wanted to go: straight into the territory 
of the mercantilists. He was going in the wrong direction. 
Having started on the wrong foot, Adam Smith hastily gave up further talk 
of division of labor. This was not the foundation on which he could build his 
critique of dirigisme; he would have to change his focus.7 And this he did in a 
hurry. After spending the first three chapters of his magnum opus discussing 
foreign trade, size of markets, productive powers and the division of labor, in 
chapter four he turned his attention to price theory and allocation of re-
sources in free markets. The division of labor would receive only a few passing 
mentions in the rest of the Wealth of Nations.8  
                                                             
5  Smith (1776/1975): 17. Allyn Young (1928: 529) has written that this was 
“one of the most illuminating and fruitful generalizations which can be found 
anywhere in the whole literature of economics.” 
6  “In manufacturing,” writes an Italian writer of the early seventeenth century, 
“production can be multiplied not merely twofold but a hundredfold, and at a 
proportionately lower cost (emphasis added).” Antonio Serra, A short treatise on the 
wealth and poverty of nations, translated by Jonathan Hunt and edited by Sophus 
A. Reinert (London: Anthem Press, 1613/2011):121. 
7  In the words of Nicholas Kaldor (1972/1989, 378) - in the middle of chapter 
four of the Wealth of nations - Adam Smith “suddenly gets fascinated by the 
distinction between money price, real price and exchange value, and from 
then on, hey presto, his interest gets bogged down in the question of how val-
ues and prices are determined for products and factors of production.”  
8  Smith (1776/1975): 64, 84,243-44,415-416, 659, and 707. In only two places 
(415-16 and 706), Adam Smith again briefly touches upon the connection be-
tween markets size and division of labor. 
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Adam Smith sought the superiority of markets in their allocative function. 
Motivated only by regard for their own interests, and making decisions di-
rected by market prices, buyers and sellers vary the amounts they buy and sell 
until each market converges upon its “central price to which the prices of all 
commodities are continually gravitating.”9 The concept of a central price - 
alternatively ‘natural price’ - was rooted in constant returns to scale.10 John 
Hicks (1989: 10) writes that in spite of what Adam Smith has to say about 
scale economies in his theory of growth, “we still find that in his value theory, 
his cost of production value theory, he does not get away from CRS [constant 
returns to scale].” In the presence of increasing returns to scale, output and 
price changes in one market would be transmitted to other markets through 
forward and backward linkages making the concept of an equilibrium and a 
natural price irrelevant. The die was cast: the ‘invisible hand’ would have to 
lean on the crutch of constant returns to scale.  
Adam Smith offered at least three arguments in favor of free trade. It aug-
mented markets, thus giving impetus to growth via division of labor; it al-
lowed capital to flow into the most productive channels based on a country’s 
absolute advantage; it gave vent to the country’s surplus. The first argument 
was flawed since it reinforced existing advantages in manufactures and com-
merce; therefore it would disadvantage countries that entered free trade with a 
handicap in these two sectors. The validity of the second argument was prob-
lematic because it would work only if capital or labor was completely free to 
cross borders.11 The third argument offered free trade as a remedy for the sur-
pluses created by shifts in trade away from a country’ exports; but greater ex-
posure to trade might worsen the problem of surpluses. In other words, the 
Wealth of Nations, failed to make a strong case for free trade. This deficiency 
had to be remedied. 
                                                             
9  Smith (1776/1975): 58. 
10  For his discussion of the relationship between market price and the natural 
price, see Smith (1776/1975): Book I, chapter 7. 
11  Alam (2000: 50-52) has written about the first two contradictions.  
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It is believed that David Ricardo (1817/1996: 93-95) brilliantly rose to the 
occasion with his theory of comparative advantage. But he succeeded only by 
changing the central question concerning the advantages of international 
trade. For four centuries, the mercantilists had framed their arguments for 
protectionism within a dynamic framework: they argued that a lagging country 
was unlikely to improve its chances of growth or preserve its sovereignty under 
free trade. Ricardo framed his question within a purely static framework: he 
ruled out changes in technology and tastes, and labor too is available in fixed 
quantities and is immobile between countries. He makes another crucial as-
sumption: production is subject to constant returns to scale. Within this static 
framework, free trade for all countries is the best policy regardless of where 
their comparative advantage lies in potato chips or computer chips. 
The classical economists’ shift towards static analysis was an ideological 
necessity. Britain had outgrown the mercantilist policies that had elevated it 
from the ranks of a backward country in the early fifteenth century to become 
the world’s leading economy by the mid-eighteenth century. In an essay on 
the rich country-poor country debate among Scottish thinkers in the eight-
eenth-century, J. M. Low writes that this was “the central point of the Wealth 
of Nations.” “Smith and [Josiah] Tucker,” he continues, “were agreed that Brit-
ain was already a rich country and hence that there really was no need for the 
government to intervene to safeguard advantages which we were in no danger 
of losing.” Unlike Adam Smith, however, Josiah Tucker had the candor to con-
cede that what was good policy for Britain was not good for poor countries. It 
would be judicious for them to take protectionists measures to raise productivity 
in their manufacturing activities.   
 
2. Neoclassical Economists 
 
Once the classical economists had chosen to demonstrate the superiority of 
free markets within the static framework of allocative efficiency, the path was 
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clear for the marginalist revolution of the 1870s with its focus on methodo-
logical individualism and marginalist analysis.12  
In order to demonstrate the efficiency of markets in equilibrium, economic 
theory would have to show that the decisions of self-serving buyers and sellers led 
to simultaneous equilibria in all markets that also produced the best allocation of 
resources.13 Leon Walras formally launched this quest in his Elements of Pure Eco-
nomics, published in two parts in 1874 and 1877. Crucially, his general equilibri-
um analysis assumed constant returns to scale in production: also, capital, labor 
and land always entered his production function with fixed coefficients. Employ-
ing more rigorous mathematics, Kenneth Arrow (1951), Gérard Debreu (1959) 
and Gérard Debreu (1954) demonstrated the existence of a solution to their sys-
tem of equations that they claimed is unique; they also established the two fun-
damental theorems of welfare economics. Their system was built on the assump-
tion of non-increasing returns to scale.  
The neoclassical production function with smooth factor substitution and 
constant returns to scale underpins at least two other ventures in neoclassical 
economics. Although the concept of marginal product of labor had been 
around since David Ricardo’s theory of distribution, the marginal productivi-
ty theory of factor prices was developed in the 1890s. While earlier writers 
                                                             
12  The Austrian economists did not obsess about equilibrium. Unlike the neo-
classical economists who assume that economic agents possess perfect infor-
mation and their decisions produce efficient market equilibria, the Austrians 
view individuals as possessing only local information about matters that affect 
that concern them. Nevertheless, they alone have the best chance of making 
the right decisions in the face of changing tastes, technology and prices.   
13  Other factors too may have propelled the timing of this shift or the 
mathematization that accompanied it. In part, at least, it would appear that 
the marginalist shift away from the labor theory of value may have been a re-
sponse to the revolutionary connotations that Karl Marx gave to the labor the-
ory of value. Philip Mirowski (1990: chapter 7) has written about the physics 
envy that pushed some economists in the late nineteenth century to adopt 
marginalist analysis and mathematical formulae.  
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had spoken of the law of diminishing returns in the context of labor applied 
to land, in 1888 John Bates Clark developed a nearly full-blown theory of fac-
tor prices that was rooted in the law of diminishing returns. He claimed that 
this law applies to the marginal return to any homogenous factor when it is 
combined with fixed quantities of other factors, provided the technology of 
production remains fixed. However this theory faced a problem: it would not 
work if payments to products did not fully exhaust the total product. Philip 
Wicksteed (1894) pointed out that product exhaustion would occur only in 
the presence of constant returns to scale. Nearly five decades later, George 
Stigler (1941: 49) added another twist: the law of diminishing returns itself 
may or may not hold in the presence of increasing returns to scale. In other 
words, without constant returns to scale the neoclassical theory of production 
would have to abandoned.  
 
3. Can the Neoclassical Economy Exist? 
 
If constant returns to scale is the cornerstone of the neoclassical economy, it is 
necessary to ask if this assumption is compatible with the existence of the ne-
oclassical economy. John Hicks has (1989) devoted an entire paper to the 
question of constant returns to scale, where examines this assumption from 
many different aspects; but he does not mention the concerns raised in this 
note.14  Allyn Young (1928) and Nicholas Kaldor (1972), two trenchant critics 
of this assumption, also do not refer to any internal inconsistency in the com-
petitive paradigm. 
Generations of neoclassical economists have appropriated high-powered 
mathematics to construct and complete the competitive paradigm. They claim 
to have discovered the exact conditions that allow for the existence of a 
                                                             
14  Indeed, John Hicks (1989: 16) offers these closing thoughts in his paper: “My 
general conclusion is that CRS, if used with proper precaution in the approx-
imate contexts, can be a help: but if misused, or if it is applied in the wrong 
context, it can indeed, as Kaldor thought, be a hindrance.”  
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unique and stable equilibrium in their decentralized economy; they also claim 
that this equilibrium is efficient. Perhaps it is tautologically true that this equi-
librium cannot exist if we were to modify any of its key assumptions; no neo-
classical economist has made the claim that the competitive paradigm is com-
patible with a variety of alternative assumptions. Thus Allyn Young (1928), 
Nicholas Kaldor (1972) and others have demonstrated the irrelevance of equi-
librium economics in the presence of increasing returns to scale. This note 
offers a different critique that questions the internal consistency of the com-
petitive paradigm. It will argue that the competitive model is logically flawed: 
the equilibrium it identifies cannot exist under its own assumptions.  In par-
ticular, this equilibrium is not compatible with one of the assumptions it 
makes about production technology: that it is characterized by constant re-
turns to scale. This demonstration does not depend on abstruse mathematics.  
We use two different approaches to establish this result. The first takes the 
neoclassical paradigm as it is and shows that the equilibrium it establishes is 
not compatible with constant returns to scale. It also identifies a limiting situ-
ation - within the parameters of this model - in which a natural economy can 
replace the competitive market economy: where the natural economy is one in 
which no exchanges take place. Alternatively, if we assume with Ricardo that 
labor is the only factor of production we discover that a natural will necessari-
ly replace the competitive market economy.  
In the presence of constant returns to scale, the unit costs of all goods are 
fixed regardless of their scale of output. This constancy of unit costs implies 
that no advantage can accrue to any economic agent from specializing in the 
production of any good.  In other words, each person can supply himself with 
the goods that he needs as cheaply as anyone else however small the quantities 
of goods that he needs for his own consumption. This line of thinking estab-
lishes a presumption that a market economy may not emerge in the presence 
of constant returns to scale: except when a person’s endowment of factors 
does not permit him to produce his preferred consumption bundle.   
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First, consider the competitive economy as it is. Suppose x1i
* and x2i* de-
note individual i’s optimal consumption bundles in a competitive economy 
that produces two goods, x1
 and x2. In the competitive paradigm the individu-
al i attains his optimal consumption bundle by selling all his factor endow-
ments on the market and then using the proceeds to buy his optimal con-
sumption bundle. It has escaped the attention of neoclassical economists that 
an individual may walk an alternative path for attaining his optimal consump-
tion bundle. Under constant unit costs an individual may choose to avoid the 
market and instead self-produce his consumption bundle. This would be quite 
straightforward if his endowment of factors turned out to be identical to the 
bundle of factor services that has gone into the production of x1i
* and x2i*. If 
the factor endowments of all individuals coincides their factor endowments 
and factor requirements (for the consumption bundle), production for the 
market would become unnecessary. Individuals would be indifferent in this 
economy between self-producing their consumption bundles or buying them 
on the market. In this event, they would prefer self-production over buying on 
the market. It might still be possible to preserve the market economy: but 
then we would have to assume that all individuals prefer market-acquired con-
sumption bundles over self-produced ones. On the other hand, the existence 
of a market economy could be ruled out if we introduce transaction costs into 
the model. 
It is much more likely, however, that an individual may not possess exactly 
the factor endowment that is required to produce his optimal consumption 
bundle. An individual can overcome this mismatch between the two bundles 
via different equivalent exchanges: trading goods, trading factors, or some 
combination of the two. In the absence of transaction costs - another assump-
tion of the neoclassical model - individuals will be indifferent between the 
three types of trades. An individual could use his factor endowment to pro-
duce goods and meet the deficit between this and his optimal consumption 
bundle via trading on the markets. Alternatively, he may use some part of his 
factor endowment for self-production and trade both goods and factors to 
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attain his desired consumption bundle. As a result, an infinite number of 
options exist for each individual to attain his consumption objective. If all 
individuals chose to trade all of their factors this and this alone would repro-
duce the competitive equilibrium of neoclassical economics. But this is a lim-
iting case: one equilibrium amongst an infinite number of possible equilibria. 
In all other scenarios, with at least some individuals engaging in some amount 
of self-production, the economy would combine markets and self-production 
to satisfy the demands of consumers. 
If labor is the only factor of production, it is easy to show that the presence 
of constant returns to scale will rule out all market exchanges. Since labor is 
the only factor of production, each individual can produce any bundle of 
goods so long as this satisfies his labor constraint. If x1 and x2 are two goods in 
this economy, and aL1 and aL2 are the corresponding labor coefficients, the 
individual’s production function is given by  
 
(1) x1.aL1 + x2. aL2 = L,  
 
where L is his endowment of labor. Equation (1) also represents the individu-
al’s budget constraint. In other words, every individual can self-produce any 
point he chooses on his budget constraint because the budget constraint is 
also his production function. Since production and consumption bundles in 
this economy are identical for all individuals, there is no need for trade. Trade 
would arise only if production technology - the labor coefficients for different 
goods - varied across individuals. But the competitive economy rules this out. 
Hence, the neoclassical market economy cannot exist. 
It does seem odd that while economists have been trying so hard to estab-
lish the existence of equilibrium in a decentralized economy - and later sought 
to establish conditions under which this equilibrium would also be unique 
and stable - it did not occur to them to ask whether there is some way in 
which constant returns to scale to undermine their economy. We have shown 
that such an economy cannot exist if labor is the only factor of production. In 
such an economy there would be no exchange since there was no advantage to 
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be obtained from specialization. If production required the use of more than 
one factor, except in the limiting case, this could produce a mismatch be-
tween an individual’s factor endowment and his factor requirements. This 
would force the necessity of trading factors, goods or both. In turn, this cre-
ates the possibility of an infinite number of equilibria depending on how 
much of their factor endowment individuals decide to use for self-production. 
Apart from one limiting case in which all individuals trade all their factors on 
the market, a natural economy would co-exist with a market economy under 
the assumptions of the competitive paradigm. 
This is not the first occasion that neoclassical economics has been - so to 
speak - hoist with its own petard. Once neoclassical economists had estab-
lished that a perfectly competitive economy is also Pareto-optimal, it nearly 
ensured that the competitive economy would be the gold standard against 
which all real-world economies would be judged. Any departures from the 
perfectly competitive economy would be deemed a market failure. Govern-
ment interventions then could only be justified if they were aimed at correct-
ing market failures. In the case of externalities, positive or negative, econo-
mists proposed that they be addressed by a combination of taxes and subsi-
dies. This logic was used by economists to recommend piecemeal correction 
of market failures; they ignored the general-equilibrium impact of correcting 
any one market failure by implicitly assuming away all other market failures. 
Lipsey and Lancaster (1956-57) were troubled by this piecemeal correction of 
market failures. As a result, they employed a general equilibrium framework 
to examine the impact of removing one market failure on other market fail-
ures. In what has come to known as the theory of the second-best, they 
demonstrated that if there are n market failures in any economy, the correc-
tion of all but one of these failures is no guarantee that this will bring the 
economy closer to Pareto-optimality. In the presence of multiple market fail-
ures, some failures may be attenuating the distortionary effects of others. As a 
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result, removing some of these failures may worsen the distortionary effects of 
the remaining market failures. 
The theory of the second-best should have had a sobering impact on the 
neoclassical focus on allocative efficiency. Needless to say, the neoclassical 
economists ignored the second-best theory; when correcting one market failure 
they simply assume that no others exist. Economists continue to propose seri-
atim correction of market failures as if unaware of the cautionary tale con-
tained in the second-best theory. This is the standard procedure in the general 
equilibrium demonstrations of free trade: they assume that there are no dis-
tortions in the economy other than the wedge between domestic and interna-
tional prices introduced by tariffs or quotas on imports or exports. Remove 
these trade-related distortions: and this will move the economy towards a Pa-
reto-efficient outcome.15  
 
4. Some Concluding Observations 
 
How did neoclassical economists miss this flaw in their core model? Perhaps 
the answer is to be found in the imperatives of the ideology that the core of 
mainstream economics has been tasked to defend: the advantages of free mar-
ket capitalism.  
It was Adam Smith who first took up this challenge. With the marginalist 
revolution of the late nineteenth century, this became the obsessive quest of 
neoclassical economists: as it were, their holy grail. Adam Smith and David 
Ricardo had already shown the way: the first by framing the efficiency of mar-
kets in a static framework, the second by doing the same for the theory of 
                                                             
15  Indeed, a team of distinguished economists spent a great deal of time develop-
ing an elaborate taxonomy of distortions and assigning appropriate policies for 
each of these distortions. They developed a general rule: the best corrective 
policy is one that attacks the distortions at its source. Policies that correct dis-
tortions at their source were ranked as first-best, others as second-best. See 
Jagdish N. Bhagwati (1971). 
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trade. In addition, both understood that they needed constant returns to scale 
if they were to employ a static framework.  Once the neoclassical economists 
had settled on Vilfred Pareto’s definition of an efficient allocation of re-
sources, it appeared to them that their objective was at hand. All that they 
needed to do was mathematize economics.  Physics and engineering became 
the new model for how to do economics. However, even with mathematical 
tools, the goal of establishing the Pareto-optimality remained elusive. Never-
theless, this quest could not be abandoned: the more elusive the goal of 
Paerto-optimality appeared, the greater has been the willingness of economists 
to suspend their disbelief - to turn their eyes away from the real world.  The 
neoclassical economists believe that they finally reached their Valhalla with 
the work of Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu; although some critics argue 
that this is doubtful.16  
It is in this intellectual atmosphere - ideological while strenuously claiming 
to be scientific - that we must seek to understand the failure of neoclassical 
economics to work out those implications of constant returns to scale that are 
developed in this note. They could not look too minutely at an assumption 
that has been so integral to their enterprise. Could not Adam smith and his 
neoclassical followers develop a defense of free markets on less restrictive as-
sumptions? The Austrian economists claim that they have done so: and they 
did it without mathematics too.  
Why then do the Austrians take a distant second place to neoclassical eco-
nomics in the economics discipline? A pregnant question whose answer may 
have been supplied by Philip Mirowski. In the late nineteenth century, as it 
was forced to change its methodology under the challenge of the Marxist doc-
trine, mainstream economics was invaded by engineers and physicists deter-
mined to import metaphors from these disciplines into economics. After this, 
the triumph of mathematics seemed inevitable. Paul Samuelson may have 
clinched this trend with his Foundations of Economic Analysis published in 
                                                             
16  Frank Ackerman and Alejandro Nadal (2004). 
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1947. Mathematics aided in the professionalization of economics: it outfitted 
economists with the ‘tools’ and ‘models’ that made them look like physicists 
and engineers.  The fate of economics was sealed.  
On this subject - mathematization and professionalization of economics - 
we can let Axel Leijonhufvud have the last word: 
 
The dominant feature, which makes status relations among the Econ of unique interest 
to the serious student, is the way that status is tied to the manufacture of certain types 
of implements, called “modls.” The status of the adult male is determined by his skill at 
making the “modl” of his “field.” The facts (a) that the Econ are highly status-
motivated, (b) that status is only to be achieved by making ”modls,” and (c) that most 
of these “modls” seem to be of little or no practical use, probably accounts for the 
backwardness and abject cultural poverty of the tribe. Both the tight linkage between 
status in the tribe and modl-making and the trend toward making modls more for cer-
emonial than for practical purposes appear, moreover, to be fairly recent developments, 
something which has led many observers to express pessimism for the viability of the 
Econ culture.   
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